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SCIENCE, POLICY, AND POLITICS: THE IMPACT OF THE
INFORMATION QUALITY ACT ON RISK-BASED
REGULATORY ACTIVITY AT THE EPA
KIRK T.

O'REILLY*

Simplified, the precautionary principle states in the face of
scientific uncertainty one should take no action that may create
harm.' As there will always be uncertainty in the field of
environmental science, this is a recipe for paralysis. Of course, that
is the goal of some. Those pushing for the furthest application of
the principle point to uncertainty to argue for ever stricter
regulations. On the other end of the spectrum, "anti-regulationists"2
argue against making any regulations in the face of uncertainty.
Most of the regulated community, regulators, and concerned
citizens are somewhere on the continuum between these extremes.
In an industrial society some level of regulation is appropriate to
limit the risk of potentially dangerous activities. Disagreement
originates from differences in beliefs about the relative value of
environmental and economic factors, and is compounded by the
inherent uncertainty in predicting risks and a lack of understanding
of the risk assessment process.

* Ph.D., Biochemistry, University of Idaho; M.S., Biology, Environmental

Science Program, Portland State University; B.S., Biological Sciences, University of California, Irvine. The author spent 15 years as a Senior Environmental

Specialist for a major oil company, has experience applying risk-based strategies
to resolving environmental issues, and obtained a JD from the University of
Idaho College of Law in the spring of 2007.
Bernard D. Goldstein and Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the
PrecautionaryPrinciplefor EnvironmentalRegulation in the United States, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 247 (2003). See also Stephan G. Wood, Stephan
Q. Wood, & Rachel A. Wood, Whither the Precautionary Principle? An
American Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective,54 AM. J. COMP.

L. 581, 590 (2006).
2 Henk van den Belt, Debating the Precautionary Principle: "Guilty until
Proven Innocent" or "Innocent until Proven Guilty"? 132 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY
1122, 1124 (2003).
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Most major federal environmental statutes authorize the
promulgation of regulations based on a finding of potential harm to
human health or the environment. 3 For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act 4 gives the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) the authority to "regulate chemical substances and mixtures
which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment."5 Risk assessment is the process for predicting the
probability, nature, and potential extent of such an injury. 6 Since
the earliest days of the EPA, scientists understood risk assessments
to be a mix of science and policy. 7 Still, the agency and reasonable
industrial interests understand that while risk assessments are far
from perfect, they provide some technical basis for setting regulations. So while regulators and the regulated may disagree on the
degree of danger of a particular compound or the most appropriate
assumptions to use in a certain situation, they realize without this
process regulations could be completely arbitrary.

E. GOTS, Toxic RISK: SCIENCE, REGULATION, AND PERCEPTION, 123
(Lewis Publishers 1993); See Table 9.1 for a summary of the language that
authorizes risk-based regulations for eight major environmental statutes.
3 RONALD

4 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (West 1997).

'Id. §2601(b)(2).
6 GOTS,

supra note 3, at 122.

7 Amoco Oil Co. v. E.P.A., 501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court stated

that EPA regulations may "turn on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks,
or on predictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge..."
8

See

RISK-BASED METHODOLOGIES FOR EVALUATING PETROLEUM HYDRO-

GAS E&P SITES (S. J. McMillen, R. I.
Magaw, and R. L. Carovillano eds., Department of Energy 2001) (discussing
industrial interests understanding the value in risk-based regulations as opposed
to regulatory limits set without any technical basis in the oil and gas industry).
See also American Standards for Testing and Materials, Standard Guide for
Risk-Based Corrective Action Applied at Petroleum Release Sites, in ASTM
CARBON IMPACTS AT OIL AND NATURAL

STANDARDS ON ASSESSMENT AND REMEDIATION
SITES 11-61 (1999).

OF PETROLEUM RELEASE
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While mainstream industrial interests understand the value
of risk assessments, 9 anti-regulationists instigated a war against
risk-based regulations in the guise of "sound science." Under the
premise that the public is more supportive of regulatory reform
based on science than economics, those in the Sound Science
Movement attack the quality of the EPA's science by highlighting
the inherent uncertainties in assessing risks and argue against
mixing science and policy.' 0 Promoting it as a means of eliminating "junk science" from the regulatory process, congressional
allies passed the Information Quality Act (IQA) as a rider to an
appropriation bill in 2000.11 The Act required the business-friendly
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a process
that allows affected parties to challenge the "quality, objectivity,
utility, and integrity" of any information disseminated by a federal
agency. According to the vice president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the OMB's program would "have the most profound
impact on federal regulations since the Administrative Procedures
Act ...by ensuring the EPA uses 12better science, and by giving
industry additional grounds to sue."'
With such an introduction, it was not surprising those who
support stricter regulations were concerned. 13 The program raised

9 Renae I. Magaw and David V. Nakles, An Overview of Risk-Based DecisionMaking for Site Management, in RISK-BASED DECISION-MAKING FOR ASSESSING PETROLEUM IMPACTS AT EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION SITES 19 (S. J.

McMillen, R. I. Magaw, and R. L. Carovillano eds., Department of Energy
2001).
10Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk
Science: Science-Based Strategiesfor Avoiding Accountability and Responsibilityfor Risk-ProducingProductsand Activities, 52 KAN. L. REv. 897 (2004).
1 Information Quality Act, 44 U.S.C.A. §3516 (West Supp. 2006).
12

Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of Public

Research in the New, SubterraneanAdministrative Law. 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 227, 228 (2003).
13

Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over

the Role of Science in Public Health and EnvironmentalRegulations. 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS.

63 (2003).
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potential conflicts 14 with the EPA's statutory mandate to protect
the public with an adequate margin of safety.' 5 Critics feared the
sheer number of challenges could distract the agency and delay
efforts toward improved regulations. 16 Also, by attacking individual studies one at a time, anti-regulationists would weaken the
weight-of-evidence approach needed to make decisions in the face
of limited data.' 7 Finally, critics raised the concern that through
judicial review of compliance, the IQA, would remove the
responsibly for making critical decisions 8from policy and technical
experts and put it in the hands of judges.'
The goal of this paper is to analyze the EPA's response to
the IQA. As opposed to the predictions from those on either end of
the precautionary spectrum, it does not appear that the Act has had
a significant impact on actions of the agency, or at least those

14Id.

at 100.

'5 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000) (requiring the EPA to
set standards that allow an adequate margin of safety to protect the public
health).
16

Wendy E. Wagner, Science for Judges II. The Practiceof Epidemiology and

the Administrative Agency Created Science: Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 589, 611
(2004).
'7 40 C.F.R. § 721.170(b) (2005) allows the EPA to determine whether a
compound is a risk to health or the environment based on a weight-of-evidence
analysis of test results. See also McGarity, 10 at 923. According to McGarity,
the weight-of-the-evidence approach resembles the fact-finding function of the
jury in civil trials in which testimony of varying degrees of quality and
credibility is offered. This approach focuses upon the totality of the scientific
information and asks whether a cause-effect conclusion seems warranted. While
individual studies may have some flaws, they still provide more useful information than would be available without the studies. But if the goal is to prevent
reaching a conclusion that could be the basis of a regulation, one seeks to first
identify and exclude any flawed studies, and to reject any decisions based on
such studies.
18

D. Hiep Truong, Daubert and JudicialReview: How Does An Administrative

Agency Distinguish Valid Science from Junk Science? 33 AKRON L. REv. 365,
370 (2000).
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visible from the outside. This is because the EPA's 30-year history
of dealing with the issues of risk assessment and data quality made
it possible to integrate processes designed to meet the IQA into
long-standing programs. The first section of this paper introduces
the basics of risk assessment, and explains how science and policy
are impossibly intertwined. The next section reviews the history of
the Sound Science Movement and how it resulted in passage of the
Information Quality Act. The third section summarizes the
Information Quality Guidelines developed by the OMB and EPA
in response to the IQA. Section IV analyzes the actual IQA
challenges submitted by the chemical industry, discusses how the
EPA has responded, and evaluates whether the IQA is having the
intended impact. Section VI summarizes arguments for and against
judicial review of agency actions under the IQA. The final section
discusses the OMB's recent attempt to assert greater control over
risk assessments conducted by federal agencies.
I.

RISK ASSESSMENT: WHERE SCIENCE MEETS POLICY

To avoid having to wait to "count the dead bodies" prior to
regulating certain chemicals or activities, many environmental
statutes are precautionary in nature as they allow regulatory action
in the absence of definite proof of harm. 19 Examples include the
Clean Water Act 2° which allows the EPA to regulate substances
that "present a ... danger to public health or welfare," 2' the Clean
Air Act 22 which grants regulatory authority over emissions if the
EPA Administrator finds they "may reasonably be anticipated to
24
endanger public health, ' 23 and the Solid Waste Disposal Act
19

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER &

JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY

346 (4th ed. 2003).
20 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001).
21Id. §1321(b)(2)(A).
22

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§7401-7671(q) (West 2003).

23

Id. at §7521(a)(1) and §7545(c)(1)(A).
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which allows regulation of waste that "may cause or significantly
contribute to an increase in mortality or ...
illness." 25 Nevertheless,
application of such precautionary language requires some method
of identifying what action "may present a danger" or "contribute to
increased mortality." In Ethyl Corp. v EPA, a 1976 case interpreting the language of the Clean Air Act, 26 the D.C. Circuit Court
stated an assessment of risk, based on all available information, is
an appropriate means of determining whether regulated activities
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health.27 The
court recognized that when a statute is precautionary in nature and
the evidence of harm is difficult to come by or is on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, the EPA need not prove a clear cause and
effect, but provide only a sufficiently-reasoned methodology to
justify regulatory action. 2 8 This case suggested a proper risk
assessment is a sufficient basis to overcome a challenge that an
agency's application of a precautionary
statute is arbitrary,
29
discretion.
of
abuse
an
or
capricious,
Risk assessment is a process of estimating the probability
of harm under certain circumstances. 30 While assessing the potential risk of chemicals in the environment has a foundation in
scientific fields such as toxicology, physiology, and chemistry, the
process of risk assessment will always be a mixture of science,
mathematics, and policy. The word risk itself, defined as "a chance
or probability of danger," is more a term of mathematics than of

24

Solid Waste Disposal Act (as Amended by the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act), 42 U.S.C.A. §§6901-6992(k) (West 2003).
25 Id. §6903(5).
26

Ethyl Corp v EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir 1976).

27

Id. at 31.

28

Id.at 28.

29

Id.at 34.

30

PAUL ILLING, TOXICITY AND RISK: CONTEXT, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,

(Taylor & Francis, 2001).

34
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science. 31 As will be shown below, the risk assessment process
takes the results of scientific studies and tries to predict what
environmental conditions will result in an acceptable risk. In
addition to the inherent uncertainty of any scientific data, there are
additional unknowns and uncertainties in each step of the process.
As no amount of experimentation will fill all the data gaps, those
conducting the assessment must make assumptions as to the type,
extent, and duration of exposure, as well as how to extrapolate data
from tests
conducted only on animals to predict potential effects on
33
humans.
By necessity, policy slips into the decision making process
in the face of this uncertainty. 34 Risk assessors ultimately
calculated the risk in mathematical equations to relate a dose of a
chemical to a potential for harm, and they deal with ambiguity by
including uncertainty factors within the equations. 35 Since there is
no "correct" value for these factors, where a person is on the precautionary continuum can influence the number he or she selects
That is not to say scientists take the values our of thin air, for there
is an entire field of inquiry and a range of valid technical arguments for determining appropriate uncertainty factors but the final
choice incorporates a policy decision of how much to err on the
side of safety. 36 Still, by multiplying uncertainty factor upon
31 THE CONCISE

OXFORD

DICTIONARY,

1189 (Della Thompson ed., 9th ed.,

Clarendon Press 1995).
32

GOTS, supra note 3, at 148.

33 ILLING,

supra note 30 at 78.

34 EPA, Risk Assessment Principles and Practices, 13 (EPA 2004); see also

GOTS, supra note 3, at 148.
supra note 30, at 78. Examples of uncertainty and conventional
multiple factor: A. interspecies variation (use of animal data to predict effect on
humans), xl0; B. human variation (impact on more sensitive individuals), xl0;
C. Nature of toxicity, up to xl0; D. Adequacy of available data, up to x100.
35 ILLING,

36 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE

RISK REGULATION 43 (Harvard University Press 1993). [hereinafter BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE].
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uncertainty factor, the calculated risk at a given concentration,
based on the same underlying
animal studies, may differ by a
37
more.
or
fold
thousand
The development of soil clean up limits for an industrial
site serves as an example of the application of regulatory risk
assessment. In setting such risk-based concentration goals, risk
assessors first seek to determine a "safe" target dose for the compound in question, and then attempt to calculate what environmental concentration of the compound would maintain the dose
below the target. 38 Determining the target dose depends on
extrapolation of results from animal studies because such tests are
conducted at higher doses, but for shorter periods than those
expected for environmental exposure. 39 The steps required to
convert animal data depend on the nature of the tests conducted,
the types and magnitude of effects detected, and whether or not the
compound is considered a carcinogen. 40 A number of different
models, each with a range of potential factors, are available to
predict potential effects at low dosage. 4 1 A critical and
controversial issue is whether there is some de minimis dose at
which there is no risk.42 As there are numerous ethical and

37 Id.

at 45; see also Mark E, Shere, The Myth of Meaningful EnvironmentalRisk
Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 409, 412 (1995), in which the author
argues the excessive use of assumptions can result in uncertainty of a factor of a
billion or more.
38

Magaw, supra note 9, at 23.

39

Id.at 24.

40

EPA, Guidelinesfor Carcinogen Risk Assessment, Chap. 3 (EPA 2005).

41

See EPA, Glossary of IRIS Terms, available at http://www.epa.gov/iris

/gloss8.htm, (last updated March 6, 2006).
42

GOTS, supra note 3, at 146. According to the author, "One of the most

profound arguments between proponents and opponents of the risk assessment
process ...is the question of thresholds. That is might a chemical ...that
produces cancer at a high dose in experimental animals, not produce it at all,
ever, under low dose circumstances typical of environmental exposure.... [But]
all commonly accepted and utilized risk assessment approaches have built into
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practical issues with testing the effects of potential carcinogens on
humans, it is impossible to answer this question with controlled
experiments. While risk assessors typically use a threshold concept
for non-carcinogenic chemicals, under the current policy they
consider any exposure to a carcinogen to have some calculable
risk.43 The EPA publishes target dose values for a number of
compounds in its Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS).44 But
as the EPA admits, while the values listed are doses at which no
adverse health effect should occur, they cannot be used to
accurately predict the incidence of human disease or the effects
chemical exposures may have on humans.45 Still, even with this
disclaimer, IRIS is a critical source for toxicity information used in
conducting risk assessments.
Even with all its uncertainty, the target dose is just the
starting point of setting a risk-based concentration. 46 To estimate
the dose under real world conditions, risk assessors make assumption about the type of exposure pathways between the contaminated material and humans. For example, gasoline contaminated
soil may be a source of benzene exposure through contact with the
soil, ingestion of impacted groundwater, or inhalation of vapors. 47
Risk assessors make additional assumptions about the nature and
extent of these pathways when they calculate the estimated exposure from each. For example, one equation relating soil concentration to potential risk has 15 variables, including such factors as the
them the public policy notion of no threshold. And, because that notion is not
known to be true, all generally accepted models, no matter how sophisticated,
are more mathematical reflections of public policy than they are of scientific
fact."
43 Id.

" Magaw, supra note 9, at 24.
EPA, IRIS Limitations, available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/limits.htm (last
updated Jan. 25, 2007).
45

46

See Magaw, supra note 9, at 23.

47 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS,

ASTM

ASSESSMENT AND REMEDIATION OF PETROLEUM RELEASE SITES.

STANDARDS ON

(ASTM, 1999).
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exposure duration, soil ingestion rate, soil to skin adherence factor,
and cross-media exchange rates. 48 The specific value of each of
these factors may either be published default values, actually
measured at the site, or the result of other multi-factorial equations. 49 Finally, assumptions about such widely dispersed issues as
the living habits of a typical person, the fate of chemicals under
various environmental conditions, and even the density of cracks in
a basement floor 5 0can all influence the calculated risk-based
concentration limit.
This point demonstrates the notion that creating and
implementing risk-based regulations involves intertwined issues of
scientific quality, uncertainty, and policy decision-making in the
face of uncertainty. As the D.C. Circuit said in 1974, such
regulations "turn on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks,
[and] on predictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge." 51 While experts agree it makes no sense to
build the complex structure of a risk-based regulation on a
foundation of shoddy experiments, scientific quality is much easier
to assess and resolve than issues of policy and uncertainty. Not
only do recognized fields of science have internal standards of
quality for publication and acceptance by peers, the EPA has
stringent regulatory requirements for many types of experiments
under its Good Laboratory Practices program. 52 Also, risk-based
regulations rarely depend on only one study, but incorporate the
results of multiple investigations using a weight-of-evidence
approach.53 Risk assessors typically evaluate the quality of the
48

1Id.at 34-35.

49 Id.

at 36-37.

5

o/d.at 37.

51Amoco,
52

501 F.2d at 741.

54 Fed. Reg. 34,052. In general, Good Laboratory Practice standards provide

methods to ensure the quality and integrity of data submitted to the EPA. This
specific rule discusses the required methods for experiments related to testing
the ecological effects and environmental fate of pesticides.
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available data when deciding on how much weight to give the
results of individual studies. Typically when critics raise questions of scientific quality, the real issue is that they disagree with
regulations based on precautionary policies. 5
II.

THE SOUND SCIENCE MOVEMENT

As the extent of risk-based regulations and the application
of risk assessments increased, anti-regulationists looked for ways
to reign in the EPA, and organized an effort to discredit the
scientific basis for risk-based rules. The presidential election of
1980 gave those who supported anti-regulatory policies a greater
voice in Washington.
Focusing on the parallel issues of
environmental regulations and toxic tort liability, the Reagan
administration created the Task Force on Regulatory Relief and
Tort Reform Policy Working Group. 57 The first Bush administration combined these efforts when it created the Council on
Competitiveness as an interagency effort to provide both liability
and regulatory relief.58 Near the end of the administration's term,
Peter Huber, a Fellow at the conservative think tank the Manhattan
Institute, published a book entitled Galileo's Revenge: Junk
Science in the Courtroom.59 Whether this book introduced or just
popularized the term junk science is unclear, but the Council on
Competitiveness used it as a mantra in advancing its reform

53 EPA, Guidelinesfor Carcinogen Risk Assessment at 1-11.
54 ILLING, supra note 30, at 80.
55 Wagner, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 77.

56 McGarity, supra note 10, at 905.
51 Id. at 902.
58 Id. at 904.
59 PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM,

(Basic Books 1991).
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proposals based on increasing the judicial scrutiny of scientific
6
expert testimony. 0
At that time, conservatives were not the only ones raising
concerns about the interplay of science and policy. In his book
Breaking the Vicious Circle, then soon-to-be Supreme Court
Justice Steven Breyer argued against an over-application of
precautionary policies in the face of scientific uncertainty because
it often resulted in the overregulation of high profile chemicals,
thus leaving insufficient resources to deal with more serious
environmental and social problems. 6' Wendy Wagner, currently
one of the loudest critics of the Information Quality Act, blasted
what she called the "Scientific Charade" used by agencies to mask
policy decisions by assigning standard-setting tasks to scientists
and associated technocrats. 62 She claimed this behavior not only
put significant power in the hands of those not identified as policy
makers,63 it also 64gave the impression that policy decisions are
based on science.
Still, it was Huber's junk science that motivated the most
active response. Anti-regulatory forces realized arguing against

60

McGarity, supra note 10, at 905.

61

BREYER, supra note 36, at 19.

62

Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95

COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1632 (1995).
63

Id. at 1634.

Id. at 1628. "[T]he esoteric nature of science-policy problems in toxic risk
regulation makes it possible for these decisionmakers to blur distinctions
between science and policy without the distortions being detected by most lay
observers, including elected or appointed officials. In fact, scientists have been
known to deliberately misidentify the hazy line between science and policy in
the past. Sociologists of science suggest that these efforts by scientists to
recharacterize the demarcation between questions of science and nonscience
occur in order to prevent ... intrusions into their scientific provinces.... That
science-policy decisionmakers might also be capable, either intentionally or
inadvertently, of shifting the bounds between science and trans-science to suit
their institutional ends when developing toxic risk standards seems equally
plausible."
64
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regulations by claiming the EPA based them on junk science was
more politically palatable than complaining about potential
economic impacts on regulated industry. 65 As Republican strategist
Frank Luntz said, "Americans unanimously believe all environmental rules should be based on sound science and common
sense. ' 66 In fact, the phrase sound science has such appeal members of both parties use it. 67 However, it was anti-regulationists
who initiated a campaign to attack the credibility of potentially
damaging scientific information, and more broadly, to shape the
68
public perception of the role of science in environmental policy.
By forming such groups such as The Advancement of Sound
Science Coalition, 69 Institute for Regulatory Policy, The Center for
70
Regulatory Effectiveness, and Citizens for a Sound Economy,
conservative forces used the call for
sound science as a smoke
71
reform.
regulatory
and
screen for tort

65

McGarity, supra note 10, at 901.

66

/d.
at 908.

67

Chris Money, Beware 'Sound Science.'It's Doublespeakfor Trouble, Wash.

Post, Feb. 29, 2004, at B2. "When George W. Bush and members of his administration talk about environmental policy, the phrase "sound science" rarely goes
unuttered. On issues ranging from climate change to the storage of nuclear waste
in Nevada's Yucca Mountain, our president has assured us that he's backing up
his decisions with careful attention to the best available research. *** It all
sounds noble enough, but the phrases "sound science" ... does not necessarily
mean what you might think. Instead, they're part of a lexicon used to put a proscience veneer on policies that most of the scientific community itself tends to
be up in arms about. *** The fact that Democrats such as former EPA
administrator Carol Browner and Sen. John F. Kerry have used the phrase to
defend their views only furthers [the] goal of blurring distinctions on these
issues."
68

McGarity, supra note 10, at 901.

69

Money, supra note 67.

70

McGarity, supra note 10, at 908.

71 Id. at

906.
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Given the bipartisan use of the term sound science, and the
breadth of groups seeking to use it to limit regulations, it is not
possible to state a single set of objectives of the Sound Science
Movement. As one skeptic suggested, science supporting one's
position is sound, while all other is junk science. A consistent
theme of the movement is first arguing regulations should not be
made unless risk is proven, and then arguing there is insufficient
data to ever prove the risk of chemicals at low concentrations.
Along with these arguments is an effort to switch the burden of
proof from the regulated to the regulators, while continually raising
the level of the burden. 73 Those in the movement wish to eliminate
the presumed discretion afforded to agencies, replacing it with a
requirement to prove causation similar to a plaintiff in a tort case. 74
Another consistent complaint of the movement is that riskbased reulations should be devoid of policy and based solely on
science. Since this demand would be impossible, it is unclear
whether it shows a sign of hypocrisy, a misunderstanding of risk
assessment, or both. Other inconsistencies include attacks on the
insufficiency of data on one hand, and arguing against taking
advantage of all the available information with a weight of
evidence approach on the other.76 At the furthest extreme, some
critics label any data suggesting man has an adverse effect on the
environment as junk science. 7

72

Hornstein, supra note 12, at 237.

73 Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense. NaturalResource Management in the

Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 249, 264 (2005).
74

Truong, supra note 18, at 370.

75 Alan C. Raul and Julie Z. Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert": A Proposal to
Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Prin-

ciples into Administrative Law 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (2003).
76

Id. at 40.

77 See, e.g., JunkScience.com, http://junkscience.com (last visited Aug. 29,

2006).
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An event that ultimately supported the Sound Science
Movement was the Supreme Court case of Daubert v Merrill Dow
PharmaceuticalsInc., which increased the role of trial judges as
gatekeepers for scientific evidence and set new standards for evaluating the reliability of technical evidence. 78 The Court rejected the
"generally accepted" standard 79 for scientific expert testimony,
which had been operative for 50 years, holding that such an austere
benchmark would be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence80 approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion
testimony. 81 The Court went on to discuss four factors judges
should use in assessing the validity of scientific evidence. 82 While
the opinion sought to loosen admissibility standards, 83 some judges
have adopted the factors as a formal test that must be passed for
scientific theories to be introduced in court. In a subsequent case,
the Court suggested each study used to reach a conclusion should
be evaluated individually, thus limiting the weight-of-evidence
approach often required to reach complex conclusions.8 4 While
Daubert was a standard civil liability case, there have been
attempts to use the concepts8 5when challenging administrative
actions through judicial review.

78

Daubert v Merrill Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

79Frye

v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir 1923).

80

See FED. R. EvID. 702.

81

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.

82

Id. at 592-94.

83

Id. at 588.

84

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997).

85

Edison Electric Inst. v. EPA, 391 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2004). While the

petitioners argued that EPA rulemaking had to comply with the standard for
scientific evidence articulated in Federal Rules of Evidence as interpreted in
Daubert,the court stated "evidentiary rules govern the admissibility of evidence
at trial, not the establishment of the processes whereby such evidence will be
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In what it hoped would give external forces and the more
business friendly Office of Management and Budget greater
leverage over the EPA's use of science in setting regulations, the
Sound Science Movement, following the Republican takeover of
Congress, sought to create a mechanism for challenging the quality
of the agency's science. In 1997, former tobacco lobbyist, sound
science devotee, and founder of the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Jim Tozzi issued a plan seeking legislation allowing
persons affected by government information to challenge the
science underlying the information. 86 As a means of taking
decision making out of the hands of those who may lean too far to
the side of safety, the legislation would allow review of such a
challenge through administrative mechanisms, external technical
panels, the OMB, and ultimately the courts. 87 Implementation of
the plan over the next three years culminated in the passage of the
Information Quality Act as a rider to the 2001 Consolidated
Appropriation Act in December 2000.88
III.

THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT AND AGENCY GUIDELINES

The IQA required the OMB to issue guidance on how to
ensure the "quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity" of information disseminated by federal agencies. Within one year of the
created," so a Daubert standard need only be met if written into the agency's
own procedures.
86

Thomas 0. McGarity, Sidney A. Shapiro, Rena I. Steinzor, Joanna Goger and

Margaret Clune, Truth and Science Betrayed: The Case Against the Information
Quality Act, 3 (Center for Progressive Regulation, 2005) available at
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/iqa.pdf.
87

88

d.at 4.
Sec. 515 of Title V of Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act

for FY 2001, Pub. L. 106-554. In summary, the Act states "The [OMB shall
issue guidelines] that provide policy and procedural guidance Federal agencies

for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies
*** [And] establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to
seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the

agency that does not comply with the guidelines."
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release of the OMB guidelines, agencies were to issue their own
guidelines to meet these goals, and to establish an administrative
mechanism allowing affected persons to89 seek correction of
information that did not comply with the act.
The OMB released its guidelines in February 200290
Unfortunately, as the document defines the key ambiguous terms
of "quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity" with other ambiguous
terms, the guidelines do little to clarify when information meets the
standard. For example, quality is defined as "comprising of utility,
objectivity, and integrity," while objectivity "includes whether the
disseminated information is being presented in an accurate, clear,
complete, and unbiased manner." 91 The OMB supports the use of
peer review by stating independently reviewed information may be
presumed to be of "acceptable objectivity., 92 With regard to risk
assessments, the guidelines require agencies to adopt or adapt the
principles described in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA).93 In
addition to basing decisions on the best available, peer reviewed
science, the SWDA 94 requires agencies to 1) identify a range of
calculated risk, as oppose to a single value; 2) identify the nature
of uncertainties encountered in determining
the risk; and 3) suggest
95
uncertainties.
the
studies to resolve
Meeting the deadline set in the IQA, the EPA released its
quality guidelines in October 2002. 96 As a compliance strategy, the
89 id.

90 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (2002).
9' Id. at

8456.

92

Id. at 8454.

93

/d. at 8457.

94

Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§300f-300j-26 (West 2003).

95

/d. § 300g-1.

96

EPA, Guidelinesfor Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity,

Utility, and Integrity of InformationDisseminated by the EPA (EPA 2002)
[hereinafter EPA, IQA Guidelines].
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agency adopted a common sense approach by building on existing
procedures so as not to impose unnecessary burdens or inhibit the
use and dissemination of information. 97 While stating it incurporated the requirements laid out by the OMB,9 8 the EPA made it
clear in the guidelines that issues concerning technical quality were
nothing new at the EPA. 99 In addition to the EPA's pre-IQA
Quality System, each program area and regional office already had
procedures for ensuring information quality.' 00 As it noted,
Congress included regulatory expectations concerning quality in
statutes governing the agency,' 0 ' and as opposed to the focus of the
IQA on information at the point of dissemination, the agency

incorporates quality principles at every step of the process.' 0 2 So
while the EPA claimed to embrace the OMB guidance, it did so by
relying on
its extensive history of striving to ensure scientific
3
quality.

10

The guidelines cite two key documents, The EPA Quality
Manual for Environmental Programs10 4 and The EPA Risk

97

Id. at 9-10. The guidelines state "ensuring the quality of information is a key

objective alongside other EPA objectives, such as ensuring the success of
Agency missions, observing budget and resource priorities and restraints, and
providing useful information to the public. EPA intends to implement these
Guidelines in a way that will achieve all these objectives in a harmonious way in
conjunction with our existing guidelines and policies, some of which are outlined below. These examples illustrate some of the numerous systems and
practices in place that address the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information."
98

Id. at 10.

99

Id. at 13.

1o0
Id.

1ot Id. at 5. "Information

quality is a key component of every statute that governs

our mission."
102Id.

"EPA works every day to ensure information quality, but we do not wait

until the point of dissemination to consider important quality principles."
103EPA,

supra note 34, at 6.
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CharacterizationPolicy and Handbook.0 5 Each explains in detail
agency policies for ensuring information quality. The goal of the
first is to ensure the EPA supports its programs and bases its
decisions on data of sufficient quality. 0 6 The second, published
just weeks before passage of the IQA, discusses the agency's
policies for dealing with the critical elements of data quality,
uncertainty, and communication in the fields of risk assessment
and management. 107 Unlike the IQA and sound science devotees,
this policy handbook recognizes that data quality0 8and dealing with
uncertainty are two distinct yet important issues.'
Quality is the easier issue to resolve because it is based on
comparing the methods used to generate data to an appropriate
standard, and determining whether the standard was met. Scientific
quality includes whether studies are well designed to develop
defensible data suitable for the purpose claimed. For example, in
an attempt to determine the impact of a chemical on a test species,
scientist must make decisions concerning the number of subjects,
use of controls, concentrations to be tested, and length of the study.
Quality also plays a role when they conduct experiments as proper
care must be taken throughout the test to ensure reliable results.
Yet even the highest quality science can result in uncertainty.
Some of this is due to the natural variability of living things and
environmental factors. Additional uncertainty arises from the need
'04 EPA, THE EPA QUALITY MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (2000)

[hereinafter EPA, Quality Manual].
105EPA, RISK CHARACTERIZATION HANDBOOK.
106

EPA, supra note 104, at 1-1.

107

EPA, supra note 105, at 1. Setting the tone for this document, the first

paragraph includes "scientific uncertainty is a fact of life and a balanced
discussion of reliable conclusions and related uncertainties enhances, rather than
detracts, from the overall credibility of each assessment ..." And, "while the role
of science to inform but not make decisions is widely recognized in EPA, and in
the larger risk assessment and regulatory community, these communities often
use the risk assessment number as the stated reason for decisions, not always
clearly highlighting the legal, economic, social and other non-scientific issues
that also go into the decision."
'08 Id. at 40.
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to understand the unmeasurable, such as the relative sensitivity of
different species or the impact of very low concentrations of
compounds on humans.
While most of the EPA IQA guidelines discuss how current
agency processes are consistent with the goal of maximizing
information quality, the document also presents three additional
issues. The first makes clear the guidelines are only that, and as
such, are not regulations, so they neither impose legally binding
requirements nor create legal rights. 10 9 Therefore, the agency
argues in its response to comments, decisions made based on the
guidelines are not subject to judicial review.110 The second issue is
the agency goes to some length to discuss the types of information
covered by the new IQA process. 11 Because most data are already
subject to other quality processes,' 12 such as those described in the
EPA Quality Manual, the agency limits application to "disseminated information" as defined by the OMB. 113 So while information distributed to the public in support of a regulation or agency
position is covered by the IQA, 1 4 similar information presented 1to5
Congress in connection with proposed legislation is not.

109 EPA, supra note 96, at 4. "Our Guidelines reflect EPA's best effort to present
our goals and commitments for ensuring and maximizing the quality of information we disseminate. As such, they are not a regulation and do not change or
substitute for any legal requirements. They provide non-binding policy and
procedural guidance, and are therefore not intended to create legal rights,
impose legally binding requirements or obligations on EPA or the public when
applied in particular situations, or change or impact the status of information we
disseminate, nor to contravene any other legal requirements that may apply to
particular agency determinations or other actions."
"0 Id. at 40.

...
Id. at 17.
. 2 Id. at 18.
"'3 Id. at 15.
114 Id.
5

Id. at 16-18.
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Additionally, the guidelines do not cover publication of the results
of EPA-funded research unless it represents the agency's official
position. 116
While noting that direct communication with those
responsible for producing information,"17 or use of the normal
notice and comment process,' 18 are the preferred approaches for
resolving technical issues, the guidelines lay out an administrative
process allowing affected persons to seek the correction of
information they feel is inconsistent with the IQA." 9 Such a party
must submit a Request for Correction (RFC). If the agency finds
the information is covered by the guidelines and the request is not
frivolous,' the office responsible for the information prepares a
response either declining to make any changes or stating what
changes it considers appropriate.1 2' If it is not satisfied with the
response, the complaining party may file a Request for

116

Id. at 17.

Id. at 30. ("If a person believes that information disseminated by EPA may
not comply with the Guidelines, we encourage the person to consult informally
with the contact person listed in the information product before submitting a
request for correction of information. An informal contact can result in a quick
and efficient resolution of questions about information quality.").
117

...Id. at 32. ("When EPA provides opportunities for public participation by
seeking comments on information, the public comment process should address
concerns about EPA's information . . . If a group or an individual raises a

question regarding information supporting a proposed rule, EPA generally
expects to treat it procedurally like a comment to the rulemaking, addressing it
in the response to comments rather than through a separate response mechanism
. . . EPA believes that the thorough consideration provided by the public
comment process serves the purposes of the Guidelines, provides an opportunity
for correction of any information that does not comply with the Guidelines, and
does not duplicate or interfere with the orderly conduct of the action.").
" 9 Id. at

30-31.

0
"E
Id. at 31-32.
121

id.
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Reconsideration (RFR). 122 Then a three-member Executive Panel
123

reviews the request and makes the final agency judgment.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE IQA AT THE

EPA

Since it issued its Information Quality Guidelines, the EPA
24
has not been inundated with RFCs, as critics of the IQA feared.
The agency publishes all the requests as well as its response and
subsequent RFR on a website, making these documents available
for review. 125 Between October 2002, when the program started,
and June 2006, only 37 RFCs have been submitted. Twenty-one of
these were from representatives of the chemical industry, five were
from government representatives, eight were from private citizens,
and three were from the building trades. Fifteen of the chemical
industry RFCs raised issues related to risk assessment, while the
others discussed site-specific compliance or other issues. 126
While most of the 15 risk-related RFCs raised legitimate
issues, it does not appear the RFC process has had a significant
effect on actions of the EPA In many of the cases, the agency
considered the RFC as an input to other ongoing processes such as
notice and comment, peer review, or chemical registration efforts.
For example, the Metam Sodium Alliance requested the EPA use a
different, and supposedly more advanced, computer model to
assess the risk of the termiticide Metam Sodium. 1In its response,

122

Id. at 34.

123

Id. at 35-35.

124

Wagner, supra note 16, at 611.

125

EPA, Information Quality Guidelines: Requests for Correction (RFC) and

Requests for Reconsideration (RFR) Submitted to EPA, available at http://
www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/iqg-list.html (last updated Aug. 24,
2006). All the RFC, RFR, and agency's responses can be linked from this site.
126 Id.
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the EPA said it would consider the request under the public
comment component of an ongoing reregistration process, and
128
noted that Alliance had already submitted similar comments.
Similarly, the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE)
requested the EPA incorporate recently published data into a
document the agency used in assessing whether to include a class
of chemicals in the Toxic Release Inventory. 129 As the hazard
assessment required for listing was still undergoing review, the
EPA responded it would consider the RFC as a late comment
under the notice and comment process, but also claimed the
assessment met all IQA requirements.130
In another case, the CRE, representing the Kansas Corn
Growers, submitted an RFC challenging the use of specific
experimental results in an ecological risk assessment conducted as
part of the reregistration process for the herbicide atrazine.'31 CRE
was especially concerned with data suggesting
132 the chemical may
adversely effect amphibian reproduction.
Using a Daubert
approach, CRE focused its challenge on the studies of one
scientist, and argued the data should be excluded because the EPA
127

Metam Sodium Alliance, Request for Correction-Risk Assessment for

Metam Sodium, 4 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/information
guidelines/documents/05004.pdf.
128

EPA, Response to RFC 05004, 2 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/

quality/informationguidelines/documents/05004-response.pdf.
129

Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, RFC on Technical Review of Diisononyl

Phthalate, 7-13 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/information
guidelines/documents/1 3166rfc.pdf.
130

EPA, Response to RFC 13166, 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov

/quality/informationguidelines/documents/1 3166Response.pdf.
131 Center

for Regulatory Effectiveness, RFC on Preliminary Environmental

Risk Assessment for Atrazine, 1 (2002) available at http://www.epa.gov/quality
/informationguidelines/documents/05001 .pdf.
132For

background information of the role of the CRE and its Sound Science

argument in the battle to reregister atrazine see, Rick Weiss, 'Data Quality' Law
Is Nemesis Of Regulation, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 16, 2004 at Al. Also
available at http://thecre.com/post/.
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had not developed an approved method for assessing low-level
endocrine effects in frogs. The agency did not prepare a specific
response to the RFC, but issued a detailed summary of all the
1 34
comments received concerning the challenged risk assessment.
The issue became moot as an IQA concern due to a consent decree
with the National Resources Defense Council, under which the
EPA empanelled a Science Advisory Panel to review
all available
135
data on the health and ecological effects of atrazine.
In very few cases has submitting an RFC effected change in
agency policy. For instance, producers of barium filed an RFC
concerning the recommended reference dose listed in the EPA
IRIS database. 136 The request contained the complainant's
interpretation of a number of toxicological studies as a basis for
requesting an increase in the reference dose. In its response, the
EPA noted the parties had been in discussion about these technical
issues since 1998 and that the agency's position is consistent with
the Quality Guidelines. 137 After the manufacturers reiterated all of
their technical points in a Request of Reconsideration,13 8 the EPA
agreed to convene a peer review process to consider all the
available data including studies published after the IRIS listing was
last updated.139 As a result, the IRIS reference dose for barium was
increased three fold in 2005.140

33

1

Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, supra note 131, at 4.

EPA, Response to RFC 2807, 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/
quality/informationguidelines/documents/2807Response 03 27 03.pdf.
134

Thomas Seeger and Joseph Tietge, White Paper on PotentialDevelopmental
Effects ofAtrazine on Amphibians, 5 (EPA 2003).
135

136

Chemicals Products Corp., RFC of the IRIS Barium and Compounds

Substance File, 4 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/information
guidelines/documents/2293.pdf.
EPA, Response to RFC 2293, 4 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/
quality/informationguidelines/documents/2293Response.pdf.
137

138Chemicals

Products Corp., supra note 136.

SCIENCE, POLICY, AND POLITICS

2007]

273

In another example, the American Chemistry Council
raised specific issues with technical information contained on an
EPA website concerning diisocyanates.14 1 In response, the EPA
discussed each of the issues, agreed to make changes it deemed
appropriate, and defended its position on the other issues. 142 The
Council initially filed an RFR, but withdrew it after
the EPA
43
1
compounds.
of
class
the
on
data
shared unpublished
In other cases, the agency only defended its positions and
made no changes based on the RFC. For example, a group
submitted a request concerning the proposed reference dose for the
arsenic-containing herbicide Cacodylic Acid published in a draft
report. 144 The group argued the EPA should have considered the
results of a particular animal study, and requested changes in the
uncertainty factors leading to a three-hundred fold increase in the
calculated target dose. 145 Although the RFC raised valid technical
issues, and responsible toxicologists could disagree, the EPA
responsed that it had reviewed the study but found it inappropriate
46
for the current use as it did not look at a cancer endpoint.
139 EPA, Response to RFR 2293A, 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/

quality/informationguidelines/documents/2293AResponse.pdf.
140

EPA, Barium and Compounds (CASRN

7440-39-3), available at

http://www.epa.gov/IRIS/subst/0010.htm, (last updated Mar. 8, 2006).
141 American Chemistry Council, RFC on Information on Health Effects of

Diisocyanates on the Designfor the Environment Web Page, 1 (2004), available
at http://www.epa.gov/QUALITY/informationguidelines/documents/04025.pdf
142 EPA,

Response to RFC 04025, 2 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/

QUALITY/informationguidelines/documents/04025-response.pdf.
143 American Chemistry Council, Withdrawal of RFC on Information on Health

Effects of Diisocyanates on the Design for the Environment Web Page, (2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/QUALITY/informationguidelines/documents/
04025A-withdrawal.pdf
144 MAA Research Group, RFC on PPRTV Derivation Support Document for

Cacodylic Acid, 2 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/QUALITY/
informationguidelines/documents/05003 .pdf.
4

Id. at 4.
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In contrast to concerns raised when the IQA was passed,
few of the RFCs have been general sound science attacks on the
use of risk assessment. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce did
submit one RFC complaining of inconsistencies between different
EPA models and databases that list physical and chemical
properties of compounds of concern. 147 Differences in these
properties, such as solubility and volatility, result in differences in
the calculated mobility and uptake of a chemical, and hence,
differences in the predicted risk. While the request raises a good
point, the "correct" value for these properties is part of the
scientific uncertainty. As one might imagine, it is difficult to
accurately measure the solubility of essentially insoluble compounds. Thus, a range of values exist in the literature, 148 and there
can be technical disagreements as to which one is the most appropriate. In its response, the agency discussed reasons for the
potential inconsistencies and how it tries to recommend methods
for selecting appropriate model inputs. Still, it agreed to add
additional disclaimers on the databases and to eliminate access to a
key database from its website. 149 While potentially inconvenient,
the loss of the database is unlikely to have much effect on the
ability of parties to conduct risk assessments as other sources of
the information are available.15 °
In a sound-science-based tirade, the Chamber's Request for
Reconsideration accused the EPA of "abdicating the public
trust" 5' and "ignoring the mandate of the IQA"' 52 by failing to
146

EPA, Response to RFC 05003, 1 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/

QUALITY/informationguidelines/documents/05003-response.pdf.
147

U.S. Chamber of Commerce, RFC on Physical/ChemicalProperty Values in

EPA Databases, 1 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/QUALITY
/informationguidelines/documents/04019.pdf.
148

KAREL

VERSCHUEREN,

ENVIRONMENTAL

HANDBOOK

OF

149 EPA, Response to RFC 04019, (2004).
150 VERSCHUEREN,

151

ENVIRONMENTAL

Chemicals 4th ed., (Wiley-Interscience, 2001).

supra note 148.

U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 147.
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initiate an inter-government multi-agency effort to "take on the
whole problem of data quality." 153 In essence, the Chamber
demands that the agency discard all uncertain data and that it cease
enacting risk-based regulations until the government recreates all
the chemical property data using some yet to be defined quality
process. Although the RFR was submitted in April 2005, the EPA
has not released an official response as of June 2006.
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) and the
American Council on Science and Health (ACSH) submitted an
154
RFC on the EPA's Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment.
The Guidelines, published in March 2005, revise and update the
agency's recommendation for assessing cancer risks first published
in 1986.15' The RFC is a general attack on the EPA's use of risk
assessments by leading anti-regulationists and sound science
advocates. Promoting the sound science myth that risk assessment
can be based solely on science without any influence of policy,
they request such assessments no longer be prejudiced by
consideration of the agency's health-protective goals.' 5 6 The RFC
argues it is inconsistent with both the IQA and the requirement for

152 Id. at

1.

53

' 1d. at 11.
154

Washington Legal Foundation, RFC on the EPA 's Guidelinesfor Carcinogen

Risk Assessment, 1 (2005), available at, http://www.epa.gov/quality
/informationguidelines/documents/05006.pdf.
"5 EPA, Guidelinesfor CarcinogenRisk Assessment (2005).
156

Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 154, at 7. "WLF and ACSH

respectfully submit that information contained in the Risk Assessment
Guidelines, regarding the use of animal studies to assess whether substances ...
are human carcinogens [does not comply with] the EPA IQA Guidelines. WLF
and ACSH call on EPA to withdraw the offending information and to amend the
Risk Assessment Guidelines so that they mandate that hazard and risk
assessment are undertaken "in accordance with sound and objective scientific
practices," not based on policy considerations divorced from the underlying
science. ***What the OMB Guidelines and the EPA IQA Guidelines bar the
agency from doing is to corrupt the scientific process by allowing extraneous
policy consideration to color scientific fact-finding."
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decisions to be based on the best available science for the EPA to
admit that in the face of uncertainty, the agency errs towards
protecting public health.' 57
In addition, the complainants seek to reduce the reliance on
animal test data as an indicator of potential human carcinogenicity
unless some yet to be defined independent scientific validation
becomes available. 158 Specifically, they request the elimination of
a default assumption designating a compound as "likely to be
carcinogenic to humans" based solely on animal data.' 59 While
raising some valid points about the inherent difficulties of
extrapolating results between species, the RFC ultimately loses
technical creditability as it quotes only the ACSH's self-published
America's War on "Carcinogens": Reassessing the Use of
Animals Tests to Predict Human Cancer Risk as the basis for its
scientific argument. 16 As so-called promoters of quality science,
their request for correction would have carried more weight if it
quoted peer-reviewed articles from respected journals.
Although the IQA guidelines indicate the EPA should
answer an RFCs within 90 days, it took 6 month for the agency to
issue a poorly-drafted two-page response.' 6 1 It starts out by
claiming the cancer guidelines are merely "non-binding statements
of policy," not disseminated information as defined by IQA, and
thus not subject to the Information Quality Act. While it may be
true that the cancer guidelines are non-binding within the EPA, this
claim is somewhat disingenuous as many outside risk assessors use
such documents as a basis for defending their work to government
regulators. It appears the agency tried to avoid debating the

157 Id at 12.
158

Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 154.

15 9

Id at 3.

160

KATHLEEN

"CARCINOGENS":

MEISTER,

AM.

COUNCIL

ON

ScI.,

AMERICA'S

WAR

ON

REASSESSING THE USE OF ANIMALS TESTS TO PREDICT

HUMAN CANCER RISK, (American Council on Science 2005).
161

EPA, Response to RFC 05006 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov

/quality/informationguidelines/documents/05006-response.pdf.
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technical issues raised in the RFC. A better approach would have
been to more clearly state that both quality science and policy
decisions are required to conduct risk assessments, and the IQA
does not require an agency to change its policies based on input
from a single third party.
As one might expect, the WLF and ACSH called the EPA
to task for claiming the issues raised in the RFC are not subject to
the IQA. 162 This resulted in their RFR being more of a debate as to
the meaning of the word "information" and the requirements of the
IQA than a discussion on the quality of the underlying science. As
stated by the WLF, the EPA should have opposed the RFC on its
merits and not pretended that the IQA was inapplicable. 163 By
focusing on procdure instead of merits, the EPA delayed resolution
of an important issue and opened itself up to a potential request for
judicial review of its response.
V.

THE

IQA, DAUBERTAND JUDICIAL REVIEW

While the EPA claims actions taken under its information
quality guidelines are not subject to judicial review, 164 others seek
to use the review process as a means of increasing judicial
oversight of risk-based regulations.' 65 With the IQA as his basis,
66
Alan Raul argues for "Daubertizing" the review process.'
Glossing over the fact the Daubert standards were developed for
tort cases where the plaintiff has the burden of proof, as opposed to
the presumed deference afforded agencies by the courts,' 67 he

162 Washington

Legal Foundation, Request for Reconsideration of RFC 05006,

1, (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/QUALITY/informationguidelines
/documents/O5006A.pdf
163Id.

at 9.

164 EPA,

IQA Guidelines at 40.

165Raul,

supra note 75, at 17.
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states the public should expect the same high standards of sound
science litigants are entitled too.' 68 Using typical sound science
69
rhetoric Raul seems shocked policy plays a role in EPA actions'7 0
or that technical assumptions are used in risk assessments.'
Seeming to want it both ways, he criticizes the EPA for failing to
conduct sufficient studies to support regulations, and for prioritizing scientific activity based on regulatory need. 17 1 A further
disingenuous argument against the quality of the EPA's science is
that those at both ends of the precautionary principle spectrum,
regulated industries and
environmental activists, voice discontent
72
with EPA decisions.1
While peer review is a critical component of the Daubert
test, 173 Raul downplays the role peer review plays in the EPA's
application of science. 174 So while external experts in the field are
considered inadequate to evaluate quality, somehow judges,
without resorting to either policy considerations or scientific
expertise, are supposed to be better able to evaluate the integrity of
the scientific process. 75 Recommending even more than Daubert
167

Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 34. "[The] standard of review is a highly deferential

one. It presumes agency action to be valid. Moreover, it forbids the court's
substituting its judgment for that of the agency, and requires affirmance if a
rational basis exists for the agency's decision." Id. (internal citations omitted).
168 Raul,

supra note 75, at 7.

169

Id. at 9.

170

Id. at 12.

'7'

Id. at 10.

Id. at 11.
17' Daubert,509 U.S. at 593.

Raul, supra note 75, at 13. "The peer-review process is designed to provide
internal agency checks on science-based decisionmaking. Though peer review is
an important component of the scientific process, the nature of peer review ...
process at EPA render it insufficient to remedy problems with agency science or
to ensure reasoned decisionmaking."
174

175Id. at 41.
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requires, Raul wants courts in every case involving agency science
to consider the reliability and relevancy of all scientific evidence
used, as well as to assess all assumptions, all conclusions, and
176
whether the agency engaged in reasoned decision making.
Reaching his anti-regulationist goal, Raul argues any agency
decision failing to 77
meet these standards should be vacated for
abuse of discretion. 1
Furthering this goal is the suggestion to bring two of the
trappings of a civil trial to judicial review. The first is the judge's
role as gatekeeper as the Court elucidated in Daubert,7 8 and the
second is placing the burden of proof on the agency instead of on
the party challenging its action.179 While a gatekeeper may make
sense to insulate a jury from proposed evidence ultimately found
unreliable, it has no role in judicial review where the judge is the
sole decision maker. Raul argues for each individual study
underlying an agency action to be subject to review and exclusion,
thus weakening the agency's overall weight of evidence basis for a
regulation.18 0 Although giving lip service to maintaining
Chevron 81' deference for agency actions, 8 2 he wants courts to
compel the EPA to defend the technical basis of its decisions,
while not requiring those challenging the agency to present any
conflicting evidence.' s3 Finally, while citing numerous cases of
17 6

Id. at 26.

177 id.

178

Id. at 40.

"9

See id. at 34.

180

Id. at 40.

181Chevron

U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 844

(1984). In the absence of conflicting Congressional language, the courts should
defer to an agency and give its interpretation of a rule or policy controlling
weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the underlying
statute.
182

Raul, supra note 75, at 36.
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judicial review of agency actions that held both for and against the
agency, Raul fails to explain why this does not demonstrate the
current system of review is working or why Daubertization is
required. 184
In response, Thomas McGarity argues against Raul's
proposal, claiming that judicial adoption of Daubert when reviewing EPA actions will result in scientifically illiterate judges
engaging in their own regulatory policymaking by continually
remanding important regulations back to the agency for further
development.1 85 He raises three primary concerns. First is the
possibility reviewing courts will discount the weight-of-evidence
approach used to select appropriate factors for risk calculations,
but instead evaluate each underlying study individually. 186 As an
example, McGarity noted in Joiner, a case in which the Supreme
Court refined the Daubert concepts, the Court excluded four
studies used to suggest cancer causation because none of them
could individually support the claim. 188 His concern is that a studyby-study evaluation would eliminate the use of epidemiological
data because real-world confounding factors lead to elevated
uncertainty, 8 9 and also prevent the use of meta-analysis, a statistical approach for evaluating the combined results of various studies
as an expanded data set. 190 Instead of improving decision making
by using all the information available, the reviewing court could
exclude potentially valuable data from consideration.

183Id. at

184

34.

Id. at 25.

185 McGarity,

supra note 10, at. 155, 171.

116

Id. at 172.

187

Joiner,522 U.S. at 147.

188

McGarity, supra note 10, at 173.

189

id.

190 Id. at 161.
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McGarity's second concern is that industry will fund
"diversionary research" to highlight uncertainty and support claims
that agencies studies fail to meet the Daubert standard. 191 Having
as little faith in the peer review process as Raul, McGarity raises
the specter of industry packing advisory boards with sympathetic
scientists who could challenge the validity of unfavorable
results. 192 A third concern is the switch from the presumed
deference afforded agency decision to requiring the agency to meet
a civil plaintiffs burden of proof.193 Together, McGarity argues
Daubertization of judicial review will inhibit the regulatory
process and provide an opportunity
for regulated industries to
94
dismantle current regulations. 1
In a recent article,195 Margaret Pak supports the EPA's
position that a response to an RFC is not subject to judicial
review. 196 While admitting the answer is as yet unsettled, 197 she
argues review is barred under both of the exemptions of §701(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 98 Under §701(a)(1),
judicial review is not available if precluded by statue.' 99 In

19'

Id. at 171. "[Regulated entities] will devote greater resources to sponsoring

diversionary research. When adverse scientific studies are published, [they] will
hire consultants to fill the scientific literature with critical and contrary
commentary that [they] will later cite to support claims that the adverse studies
are fatally flawed."
192 Id.
19 3 id.

194

McGarity, supra note 10, at 925.

Margaret Pak, An IQ Test for Federal Agencies? Judicial Review of the
Information QualityAct under the APA, 80 WASH. L. REV. 731, 734 (2005).
195
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EPA, IQA Guidelines at 40.
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Pak, supra note 197, at 733.

198

Id. at 734.

199 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2000).
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evaluating statutes which are silent as to judicial review and have
only a sparse legislative history, courts look to whether congressional intent is "fairly discernable" from the statutory scheme as a
whole.20 0 Pak claims the statutory requirement for each agency to
develop its own internal administrative mechanisms for reviewing
RFRs, together with statutory silence as to the availability of a
judicial mechanism, indicates
congressional intent against the
20 1
possibility of judicial review.
Also, under APA §701(a)(2), judicial review is not
available if the agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law. z20 Statutes and subsequent regulations indicate such discretion
when they are written in such broad terms that there is no law for
the courts to apply. 20 3 In this case, the IQA sets no standards, but
defers to the OMB the discretion to develop guidelines for assuring
quality.20 4 The OMB guidelines further defer to the EPA the
responsibly of establishing standards for assuring compliance, and
for evaluating its own response. 205 As Congress left it to the OMB
and other agencies to both define the key terms of "quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity" and to develop the processes for
administrating compliance, Pak argues agency discretion is sufficient to meet the exemption to judicial review under §701(a)(2).2 °6
While the issue has not been decided at the appellate level, one
federal court agreed the IQA does not provide a mechanism for
judicial 7 review of information quality or any avenue for judicial
20
relief.

200

Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984).
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Pak, supra note 197, at 752.
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THE OMB's NEXT STEP

It appears the OMB believes the IQA has not been a
successful method for controlling the EPA's use of risk
assessment. In January 2006, the OMB released for public
comment, 20 8 and The National Academy of Sciences reviewed, a
"Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin" as part of its ongoing effort
to improve the quality of scientific information. 20 9 Apparently with
a goal of taking control away from technical agencies, the OMB
proposes a program, under authority of the IQA, where influential
risk assessments will require approval by its own Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, as well as the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy. 2 1 Even assessments that
do not meet the criteria to be considered influential require
certification as to compliance with both the OMB bulletin and
IQA. 211 It is unclear whether this requirement will merely add
another step in the internal review process or be a means of
limiting the distribution of unfavorable information. In either case,
the OMB attempts to forestall any judicial review of its action by
claiming the bulletin is intended only to improve the internal

207

Salt Institute v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 601 (E.D. Va. 2004). In

reaching its conclusion, the court held "There is nothing in the IQA that
provides a right of action in a court of law for alleged violations of its
provisions... The statute also prescribes the process to be followed if a party
complains that an agency has failed to adhere to the established guidelines...

The language of the IQA reflects Congress's intent that any challenges to the
quality of information disseminated by federal agencies should take place in
administrative proceedings before federal agencies and not in the courts."
20 71 Fed. Reg. 2600 (Jan. 17, 2006).
209

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin (2006),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposedriskassessment
_bulletin_010906.pdf.
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Id.at 21-22.

211 id.
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management of the Executive Branch and, as such, does not create
2 12
any right enforceable at law against the OMB or other agency.
Interestingly, the technical requirements presented by the
OMB show an understanding of the challenges inherent in assessing risk and are in many ways consistent with recommendations
previously published by the EPA. While still basing its authority
on the IQA, the document has little sound science rhetoric blaming
uncertainty on the lack of technical quality. 213 Following the lead
of the EPA's Risk CharacterizationHandbook, the OMB recognizes uncertainty and the need for relying on assumptions will
always be part of the process, but apparently believes that with
proper communication, policy makers and the public will understand the outcome. 214 While this notion may be unrealistic, as even
many environmental specialists don't fully understand all the
components of an assessment, attempts at better communication
with a non-technical audience should improve the value of assessments to decision makers.
Building on the EPA's recommendation to identify the
possible range of risk, not merely a single risk value, 215 the OMB
seeks to require the identification of a plausible range of risk
estimates whenever there is uncertainty. 216 While this makes sense
technically, it will be interesting to see in practice how such

212

Id. at 26.

213 Id. at 3.
214

Compare

BULLETIN
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EPA,

OFFICE OF MGMT.

BUDGET,
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at 14 to EPA, RISK CHARACTERIZATION
RISK CHARACTERIZATION HANDBOOK

EXAMINATION OF
216

&

EPA

OFFICE OF MGMT.

HANDBOOK

at 15.

at 37; see also EPA, AN

RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES,

& BUDGET,

at 16.

PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN

at 17.

"When there is uncertainty in estimates of risk, presentation of single estimates
of risk is misleading and provides a false sense of precision. Presenting the
range of plausible risk estimates, along with a central estimate, conveys a more
objective characterization of the magnitude of the risks. Influential risk
assessments should characterize uncertainty by highlighting central estimates as
well high-end and low-end estimates of risk. The practice of highlighting only
high-end or only low-end estimates of risk is discouraged."
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information will be used in setting or applying regulations. It may
be that while risk assessments include such range information, a
specific value or values will still be used in decision making.
Critically, there are distinct policy differences between the agencies in selecting that value. While the EPA, with the goal of beinl
protective, typically highlights risk at the high end of the range,
the OMB specifically discourages this practice, recommending
instead focusing on the center on the range. 218 Given that the range
of risk estimates may be several orders of magnitude, this can have
a significant impact on the final understanding of risk.
The OMB's effort to take control of risk assessments
conducted by federal agencies suffered a serious blow with the
release of the National Academy of Science's review of the
proposed bulletin. 2 19 In its report, the Academy's National
Research Council calls the bulletin "fundamentally flawed,"
concludes it cannot be rescued, and recommends that it be
withdrawn. 22 Among the Council's concerns is the OMB's
recommendation to focus on the center of the range of estimated
risk because this fails to protect sensitive populations. 221 Another
concern is the OMB's suggestion that clinically apparent health
effects be the measure of harm as this ignores the fundamental
public-health goal of preventing impairment. 2 22 The report notes
217

EPA,

AN EXAMINATION OF

EPA

RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND

at 20. "In response to both uncertainty and variability, EPA develops
risk estimates using default assumptions based on empirical evidence or based
on scientifically sound extrapolations. Further, EPA risk assessments are in fact
a combination of both high-end and central tendency estimates. Consequently,
the resulting risk estimates are expected to be on the high end of the range of
risks but within the range of plausible outcomes."
PRACTICES
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BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN
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that while the OMB's stated purpose is to improve the technical
quality of risk assessments, implementation of the bulletin will
have the opposite effect.2 23 In support of the status quo, the
Council strongly recommends that efforts to improve the science
of risk assessment be the responsibility of the
technical agencies
224
which have the required depth of experience.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This review suggests the IQA has not had a significant
impact on the workings of the EPA, at least those visible from the
outside. Given the agencies experience in handling public input as
part of the normal administrative notice and comment process, it
should not be burdened by the relatively few Requests for
Correction submitted A typical response to an RFC is to consider it
another public comment. Furthermore, instead of focusing on creating some separate bureaucratic mechanism, the EPA has sensibly
integrated the IQA effort into its many technical review and quality
assurance programs. What remains to be seen is whether control of
the IQA compliance process will stay with the agency, or be taken
over by either the OMB or the courts through judicial review.
The IQA has failed to have its predicted effect on the EPA
for two primary reasons. First, its proponents' purposeful strategy
to define the problem as one of scientific quality, and not policy
differences on acceptable risks, makes it easy for the agency to
comply by taking advantage of its ongoing quality improvement
efforts. Secondly, as the EPA has been dealing with the issues and
inherent problems of risk assessment since its inception, and has
published countless recommendations and guidance documents on
the topic, anti-regulationists might have been naive to believe that
major changes could be made based on the 235 words of bureaucratic gobbledygook in the IQA. Or in other words, it is hard to
change the direction of an aircraft carrier with a dinghy. Of course
222

Id.

223

Id. at 2.
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Id. at 5.
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this could all change if judicial review finds the EPA strategy for
dealing with IQA to be inconsistent with the Act, or if the OMB
gains greater control of the risk assessment process.
This review suggests there has been little impact on the
external working of the EPA. That is not to say information quality
and sound science concepts are not being used to slow down
regulatory efforts from within. An administration with a reputation
of twisting information for its own purposes 225 and of suppressing
scientific findings inconsistent with White House ideology 226 has
many ways of exercising its influence over an agency. As the real
issue is one of policy and not science, it is expected that agency
actions will reflect the concerns of the executive branch.
Nevertheless, such influence is part of the workings of the
administrative state and could be done with or without the IQA.
A problem with focusing on quality instead of policy is that
it distracts from efforts to make real improvements in the process.
As currently practiced, risk-based methods lead to over-regulation
of some high-profile compounds by utilizing overly stringent
assumptions, while ignoring others for lack of information. There
should be greater focus on the concept of relative risk. This
includes consideration of the unintended consequences of attempting to eliminate de minimis risks as well as, promoting improvements in public health as a means of offsetting risks caused by
industrial activity. 227 While there will never be complete agreement, the debate should honestly focus on deciding the proper
place along the precautionary continuum.
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